

REPEAT MIGRATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES, 1870–1914*

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1. *Physical migration and its repetition*

Late nineteenth and early twentieth century transatlantic migration was among the greatest and most transparent intercontinental population transfers ever, but historical studies of its causes have infrequently encompassed all of Europe, and have tended to skirt around the intricate set of mechanisms by which the relocation was physically affected. How the Atlantic crossing evolved from one-time resettlement into repeatable travel for temporary employment, has also not been systematically connected to the broad overall causes behind migrant self-selection.

This paper seeks to contribute to explaining the general processes of two-way migration across the North Atlantic in the context of an environment wherein such relocation was legal, readily affordable, and clearly economically advantageous to many more Europeans than the roughly twenty one million who actually undertook it between 1870 and 1914.¹ Doing so thoroughly and accurately, however, turns out to require dealing with long unresolved problems of inconsistencies and deficiencies in the basic migration data on most prior historical accounts have relied. In particular, official U.S. records after 1900, although generally of relatively high quality and scope, nevertheless undercounted overall migration slightly, and repeat migration greatly,

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¹ From Appendices 1 and 4 below: About twenty four million migrant crossings were made westwards from Europe to the United States in those years, but somewhat over three million were made by “repeat migrants” who had already traversed the ocean westwards at least once before.

inadvertently helping to foster under-appreciation of the rising rate of repeat migration over the 1870–1914 period as a whole.

The more immediate goal herein is therefore to develop more accurate measures of repeat migration in this period, and to examine some associated implications for broader processes of relocation between Europe and the United States. These migration processes and measurement issues are explicated in six sections below. The first, third and fourth sections deal with definitional matters: most especially, which transatlantic moves by individuals should be counted as migration, and how to most effectively measure those moves and that migration. The resulting methodology is used in the fifth section to analyze the principal motivations behind migrants crossing the North Atlantic more than once. The second section meanwhile argues more basically that to be comprehensive, any explanation of the relocation as a whole (including one-time and multiple moves) must account for the large number of Europeans who shared fundamental demographic and socio-economic characteristics with those who emigrated, but nevertheless chose to stay in Europe.²

The sixth and final section of this paper develops such an explanation by relating the central features of transatlantic repeat migration to the general self-selection processes influencing the overall numbers who relocated. Moving across the North Atlantic a century ago, for a non-permanent but indefinite period of low-skilled work, was an inherently risky endeavor. Most potential European emigrants dealt with that risk by avoiding overseas relocation altogether. The minority which did relocate to the New World consisted, for the most part, of those able and willing to diversify their endeavors over multiple moves within families (“chain migration”) and multiple moves per individual (“repeat migration”).³

This study has been inspired both directly and indirectly by the scholarship of Jan de Vries. As a student of his teaching and writings, one could not help but be impressed by the potential for historical

² Klaus J. Bade, *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. (Munich: Beck, 2000, revised paperback edition, 2002), 146.

³ Drew Keeling, “Costs, Risks and Migration Networks between Europe and the United States, 1900–1914,” in *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, Torsten Feys, Lewis R. Fischer, Stéphane Hoste and Stephan Vanfraechem (eds.), *Research in Maritime History* 33 (St John’s, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2007), 134–47, 155–57.

importance embedded within what otherwise might have seemed to be mundane economic phenomena. Utilitarian barge canals might be a catalyst for far-reaching changes in personal mobility or even a barometer of general economic health. Quiet, defensive-minded workers in early modern “proto-industry” might be the unplanned agents of an “industrious revolution.” With such examples before me, and taking up the question of the factors shaping historical long-distance mass migration, I felt encouraged to try to carefully quantify these human flows and examine what their magnitudes might indicate about underlying causal processes. Many of the basic trends in nineteenth century U.S. immigration were obvious already to contemporaries, but decades of subsequent historical research might be usefully extended by applying “de-Vriesian” combinations of meticulousness, inquisitiveness, and creative encapsulation.⁴

By the late 1870s, for example, sailing ships had been completely replaced by steamships in providing passenger travel services across the North Atlantic. Over the course of succeeding decades (up to World War I, which effectively ended transatlantic migration on a mass scale), human movement across that ocean became noticeably more “circular.”⁵ How widespread this change was, and what caused it, are the sorts of questions which to answer requires digging beneath well-known surfaces to uncover additional nuggets of information.

Before 1870, migration across the North Atlantic is thought to have consisted overwhelmingly of “once-and-for-all” relocations. During the years 1908–1914, by contrast, half of North Atlantic migrant crossings were part of multiple-move “back-and-forth” transfers.⁶ The “steamship revolution” itself, by reducing both transit times and travel

⁴ The analysis here is an outgrowth of research conducted for my PhD thesis. Jan de Vries served on the dissertation committee, together with Gerry Feldman, Jon Gjerde, and Richard Sutch. (Drew Keeling, “The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the USA, 1900–1914,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2005)).

⁵ J.D. Gould, “European Inter-Continental Emigration, The Road Home: Return Migration from the U.S.A.” *Journal of European Economic History* 9 (Spring 1980), 111, Karl Thiess, *Deutsche Schifffahrt und Schifffahrtspolitik der Gegenwart* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 141.

⁶ From Table A-1 of Appendix 1: During 1908–14 there were 10.4 million migrant crossings between Europe and the U.S. 6.8 million traveled westward (to the U.S.) and 3.6 million went eastward (to Europe). Of the westward crossings, 1.5 million were repeat moves. Since only migrants of European origin are tallied here (see the definition of “migrant” below—only negligible numbers of U.S.-born persons moved to Europe during the period) all eastward crossings of migrants were also

risks, undoubtedly made the possibility of a repeat crossing more palatable to migrants. The overall effect of travel improvements upon mass migration remains unclear, however, partly due to the difficulties of defining and measuring migration.⁷

Migration is ubiquitous to life. Birds do it, bees do it, even plants do it (intergenerationally), and it has been part of human history from its African origins to its globalizing dispersion today. Whether viewed as departure (emigration), as arrival (immigration) or both (migration), long-term moves of people on a wide scale across political borders have grown in importance for human societies along with the rise of the political power structures demarcated by those boundaries, and human migration has acquired a host of varying meanings to those who have studied it in recent decades.⁸

For understandable practical reasons, migration has often been regarded by governmental authorities and policy-makers as being externally or “exogenously” determined. Migration can be discouraged or adapted to, regulated or channeled, its benefits accentuated, or its negative impacts ameliorated, but its ultimate *sources* have been implicitly considered to be beyond reach, associated with inscrutable human psychology, deeply-rooted economic conditions, and unpredictable calamities, “natural” or “man-made”. By contrast, the *effects* of mass migration though often disputed, have been more readily apparent. The demographic and social consequences of individuals, families, and communities from one society being “transplanted” into another, for instance, tend to be widely noticed. Thus, while the ultimate causes of international migration have often seemed relatively obscure, the interest of many politicians and scholars has focused instead on

repeat crossings. Total repeat migrant crossings ($1.5+3.6 = 5.1$) divided by all migrant crossings (10.4) equals 49% ($5.1/10.4 = .49$).

⁷ Walter Nugent, *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 34, 156–57, James Jackson and Leslie Page Moch, “Migration and the Social History of Modern Europe,” in *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives*, Dirk Hoerder and Leslie Page Moch (eds.) (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996), 56, Drew Keeling, “Transatlantic Shipping Carrels and Migration between Europe and America, 1880–1914,” *Essays in Economic and Business History* 17 (1999), 206.

⁸ Among many fine overall introductions to the field, McNeill and Adams’ collection remains one of the most illuminating. (William H. McNeil and Ruth S. Adams, (eds.) *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)).

the challenges of dealing with migration's more readily discernable effects.⁹

The broad ethnic and linguistic diversity of the European overseas exodus, in the decades before the First World War, have enabled many interesting comparative analyses of the social, racial, or political ramifications of migration, the cultural exchanges associated with it, the sociological trajectories of alienation and assimilation, and identity transformations in ethnic diasporas, and so forth. Causal aspects governing who moved, who did not, and why are crucial questions less frequently investigated in the prior literature on transatlantic migration.

This paper addresses such historiographical gaps in the limited but basic sense of straightening out statistical inconsistencies and tapping complementary but rarely used data from passenger shipping records, in order to accurately and comprehensively measure migratory movements by European origin region and time period.¹⁰ The transatlantic relocation is principally examined here as a process organized within self-selected families and kinship networks.

"Migrant", unless otherwise specified, is broadly defined here as follows:¹¹

A *migrant* (between Europe and the United States) is any traveller born outside the United States making any crossing of the Atlantic for the purpose, with the result, or as a consequence of long term residency in the United States.

Consistent with this:

⁹ Discussed further in the third section, "Migration as flows and processes," below.

¹⁰ See the fifth section ("Seasons, reasons, and regions") and Appendix 1 below.

¹¹ These definitions do not adeptly classify a few interesting though statistically negligible forms of movement: A European-born person moving to America as an infant, and making a summer holiday in Europe fifty years later would then be crossing as a "migrant" (and a "repeat migrant.") A U.S.-born child accompanying its European-born immigrant parents on their return to Europe would be a "non-migrant." A diplomat from Europe, having made a "long term" stay in the U.S., would thereafter be a "repeat migrant" each time he time he crossed the Atlantic. The definitions also ignore the (however relatively miniscule) counter-current of U.S.-born adults who relocated permanently to Europe in this period. During 1870 to 1914, Europeans moving to America constituted over ninety percent of all U.S. immigrants, and about half of all trans-oceanic migration (Keeling, "Networks," 162, Historical Statistics of the United States, Series C89-102, 106-107, data in Walter F. Willcox and Imre Ferenczi (eds.), *International Migrations* (New York: NBER, 1931)).

A *repeat migrant* (between Europe and the United States) is any migrant making two or more transatlantic crossings (west or east).

These definitions¹² may seem straightforward, but they differ from those implicit in most previous migration histories in several important respects. One such difference is based partly on semantic convenience: any migrant crossing the ocean more than once is designated, by the definitions used here, as a “repeat migrant.” This contrasts with the more typical differentiation between sub-types of multiple ocean-crossers based on the direction of travel.¹³

Another definitional difference is the lack of any “expiration date.” Under the designations used here, a European migrant to the United States does not cease being a migrant merely by virtue of having already made a previous sojourn in America.¹⁴ In other words, there is no attempt *within the definition itself* to obtain a measure of “net” rather than “gross” migration. Precisely that intent led to a change in the definition of “immigrant” used by the U.S. Bureau of Immigration starting in 1906.¹⁵ As a result, official U.S. Bureau of Immigration [BI] reports and data give the erroneous impression that repeat migration was lower, during the nine year peak immigration years of 1906–1914, than it had been during the six years preceding.¹⁶

Simplifying, but only slightly, a passenger between Europe and the United States who was not a tourist or business traveller is straightforwardly assumed here to have been a migrant, and a repeat migrant

¹² The fourth section below, “Distinguishing between migrants and non-migrants,” provides further details and rationale.

¹³ The more common terminology categorizes migrants going east (back to Europe whence they came) as “return migrants,” and only those among them who later moved *again* to America, are labelled as “repeat migrants” (on the occasion of any westward crossing other than their first one). By not counting eastward migration crossings as repeat migration, this traditional characterization has contributed to the under-appreciation of multiple moves as a salient aspect of turn-of-the-20th century transatlantic migration.

¹⁴ Even if U.S. citizenship was acquired in the meantime. See also Appendix 1.

¹⁵ See Neil Larry Shumsky, “‘Let no Man Stop to Plunder!’ American Hostility to Return Migration, 1890–1924,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 11(2), (1992), 56–76.

¹⁶ Quite to the contrary, as shown in Appendix 3, repeat migration rose in the years just prior to World War I. From about 700 thousand for the years 1900–05, it amounted to nearly two million during 1906–14. In U.S. government statistics after 1905, however, repeaters were generally classified as “non-immigrants.”

if he or she had previously crossed the Atlantic already). Nevertheless, even with the overall migration flow magnitude revised upwards thereby, it was still remarkably small relative to its potential.

2. Why did “so few” leave Europe?

The general causes of migration across the open borders of the late nineteenth century Atlantic basin are “over-determined.” The economic advantages of relatively high U.S. wages were well-known, legally accessible, and economically attainable.¹⁷ The all time highest rate of immigration relative to the U.S. population had already occurred, however: during the 1840s and 1850s exodus from Ireland, then one of Europe’s most impoverished regions, and before steamships cut migrants’ oceanic transit times by two-thirds.¹⁸ The “more important” unanswered question about migration after 1870 is therefore, as economic historian Dudley Baines has put it, “not what factors caused people to emigrate but what caused so few people to emigrate.”¹⁹ Addressing this question requires measurements suited towards general explanations of the migration’s fundamental causes and processes.

¹⁷ Most Europeans then could reasonably expect to recoup total relocation costs within six months of arriving in America, assuming they found employment promptly (Keeling, “Networks,” 132–37, 168–70). Gavin Wright (“The Industrious Revolution in America,” in this volume) shows how the mass migration pursuing these high U.S. wages exemplifies key features of Jan de Vries’ “industrious revolution.” These migrants were mobile and hard-working participants in a mobile and work-intensive economy. Producing and consuming almost exclusively for and from the market, their industriousness encouraged and was encouraged by America’s reliance on short term low-skilled labor, flexibly used in large-scale, capital-intensive enterprise.

¹⁸ Drew Keeling, “Transport Capacity Management and Transatlantic Migration, 1900–1914,” *Research in Economic History* 25 (2008), 267–68, and Maldwyn Allen Jones, *American Immigration*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1992), 61–92, 158.

¹⁹ Dudley Baines, *Emigration from Europe, 1815–1930* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 28. See also Frank Thistlethwaite, “Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in *A Century of European Migrations, 1830–1930*, Rudolph Vecoli and Suzanne Sinke (eds.), (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991, originally published after a 1960 conference), 36–37. There is a general consensus among scholars that although most migrants during the period eventually settled in America for good, many -if not most- came with the original intention of staying only temporarily. Psychological antipathies to permanently forsaking one’s roots are thus an insufficient explanation for why a large majority of Europeans did not migrate overseas at all (see Mark Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 193, Baines, 39–47).

3. *Migration as flows and processes*

Historical research on late nineteenth and early twentieth century migration has typically followed the lead of contemporary government statisticians wanting to distinguish “permanent settlers” from “temporary sojourners.” Transatlantic relocation has been categorized and analyzed in considerable detail on this basis, but without being accompanied by a comprehensive quantitative foundation.²⁰

Attempting to sort migration into subsets differentiated by degree of “permanence” is, however, at odds with a growing scholarly consensus of recent decades: that the unit of migration is more often the kinship or community group than the individual, that such migration units are frequently composed of multiple individuals making multiple moves over multiple years, and that the total and integrated intention and outcome, in most cases, is a shifting mixture of both permanent and temporary relocation.²¹ This awareness was reflected in the widely heeded call of historian Frank Thistlethwaite in 1960 for a “new look at the subject as a whole” whereby scholars would “treat the process of migration as a complete sequence of experiences.”²² Although Thistlethwaite’s advocacy of a broad transatlantic perspective has powerfully influenced half a century of subsequent migration historiography, the “harvest” of scholarship he helped inspire has not included any major revision to the pattern wherein “it has been the consequences and not the causes of migration which have received the most attention.”²³ This imbalance is also reflected in the formulation of the government immigration statistics upon which historians have typically relied.

If one’s primary objective is to illuminate migration’s many-faceted effects, then it is statistically important to focus on the population levels most directly associated with those effects (especially the numbers of foreign-born in the U.S.) at different points of time. The principal concern here, however, is with the causal processes by which a minor-

²⁰ Walter D. Kamphoefner, “The Volume and Composition of German-America Return Migration,” in *A Century of European Migrations, 1830–1930*, Rudolph Vecoli and Suzanne Sinke (eds.) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 305.

²¹ Charles Tilly, “Transplanted Networks,” in *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, Virginia Yans-McLaughlin (ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 84.

²² Thistlethwaite, 22.

²³ Thistlethwaite, 19, 57.

ity of young European adults from lower-to-middle income families chose to physically relocate in the first place. Accordingly, the statistical emphasis here is less on ultimate changes in population *stocks* than on the continual series of *flows* over time, in both transatlantic directions, that were the relatively immediate and homogeneous outgrowth of those causal processes. Following this approach requires, in turn, correcting for the inconsistent definitions and classifications of U.S. authorities,²⁴ who, in attempts to better measure net additions to the stock of the U.S. population from abroad, obscured and understated the magnitude of the underlying flows, the frequency of multiple moves, and the extent to which ship accommodations used by migrants deviated from traditional wooden-slatted steerage.²⁵

4. *Distinguishing between migrants and non-migrants*

The measurement of cross-border movements of people is notoriously fraught with statistical difficulties.²⁶ Transatlantic migration a century ago—despite being atypically legal and well-documented—is not an exception.²⁷

The general assumption governing U.S. statistics-gathering for most of this period was that immigrants were only those foreigners making once-and-for-all westbound crossings in the steerage class. This definition was revised three times after 1900, however (in 1903, 1905, 1908). As a result, there are notable inconsistencies within the Bureau of Immigration (BI) statistics for 1900–1914, a period marked by high

²⁴ The Bureau of Immigration ["BI"] data are geographically broader than those collected by European government entities, and thus remain the most-used of official government immigration statistics. Their limitations, however, mean that greater accuracy comes from using them, as here, in conjunction with shipping statistics of the Transatlantic Passenger Conferences Records, "Reports of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Movement," New York, 1899–1914 ["PCR"]. Appendix 2 below reconciles the BI and PCR totals for the period.

²⁵ For a good general introduction to the measurement difficulties see E.P. Hutchinson, "Notes on Immigration Statistics of the United States," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 53 (1958), 963–1029. Gould is also helpful. Simon Kuznets and Ernest Rubin, "Immigration and the Foreign Born," National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 46, 1954, 87–94, offer a useful example of a stock-based analysis.

²⁶ See for example, *Economist*, "Cross Frontier Chaos," June 15, 2002, 50–51.

²⁷ See especially Hutchinson, for the most definitive prior cataloguing of these problems.

migration volumes documented in relatively complete detail. The new measures shown in Table A-1 of Appendix 1, columns 3 and 8, reduce these inconsistencies considerably by making the following adjustments to the BI data:²⁸

- 1) Before 1903, the U.S. Bureau of Immigration (BI) counted as “Immigrants” only those Europeans crossing to the U.S. in steerage (“third class”). The new time series of “westbound migrants” shown here in column 3 of Table A-1 in Appendix I sums up migrants in all shipboard travel classes for the *whole* 1900–1914 period. (During 1870–99, fewer than 5% of European migrants arrived in cabin class, on average, but for 1900–1914 that rose to 14%).
- 2) After 1905, the BI stopped counting as “Immigrants” those who had “been in the U.S. before,” and instead lumped them together with European tourists and short term business travellers in the general category of “Non-Immigrants.” The series “westbound migrants” of Table A-1 undoes that major source of inconsistency and confusion, by classifying such “been before” arrivals as migrants throughout the period.
- 3) In 1908, the BI began counting “emigrants” departing the U.S. (see column 6 of Table A-1 in Appendix 1 below). Those figures are notably inaccurate, however, and the method of correction used in Table A-1 generates instead the “eastbound migrant” flows for 1900–14 shown there (in column 8). See also Table 2 below. Based on more sparse underlying data, less precise but still reasonably accurate estimates for eastbound migrant flows have been developed for 1870–99 as well.
- 4) As defined here, “migrants” include naturalized U.S. citizens travelling between Europe and America. That designation is based on records indicating that about one third of U.S. citizens travelled in

²⁸ Appendices 1–3 below provide further information on the methodologies used and measurements obtained. Estimated percentages of migrants in steerage and cabin class based on update of calculations used in Drew Keeling, “The Transportation Revolution and Transatlantic Migration, 1850–1914,” *Research in Economic History* 19 (1999), 50, 56. The “adjustments to the BI data” described here apply essentially to the last fifteen years (1900–14) of the period, firstly, because that is when most of the inconsistencies in the data of the BI (for example, in the BI annual reports) occurred, secondly, because there are more alternative sources available after 1900 for making such adjustments, and, finally, because well over half of the migrant volume of 1870–1914 occurred during those final fifteen years of the period.

the steerage class, that nearly all U.S. citizens in steerage were naturalized Europeans, not native-born Americans, that their crossings were mostly roundtrips from America to (and back from) small villages in Europe²⁹ and that on the westbound traverse they often accompanied non-citizen relatives from those villages who were migrating to the U.S. for the first time.³⁰

These adjustments have been made in order to clearly and accurately divide the gross flows of passengers between Europe and the U.S. into migrants (as defined here) and non-migrants going in both directions for the entire period. The resulting figures shown in Table A-1 of Appendix 1 and in Appendix 2 indicate that official U.S. government tallies normally used by historians understate overall westbound migrant inflows to the U.S. from Europe by more than 10%.³¹ Other important revisions yielded by this analysis, for the 1900–1914 period,³² are that:

²⁹ i.e. U.S. citizens in steerage were not on summer sightseeing tours of Europe as citizens in first class often were. Although naturalized and native-born citizens were not routinely distinguished on passenger lists, the length and purpose of stays in Europe often were (U.S. National Archives: microfilmed passenger lists of arriving vessels, 1900–14). Accompanying family members arriving in America were usually grouped together on those U.S. passenger lists, and dozens of sampled lists, across many years and routes, show clearly that the incidence of non-English first and last names among U.S. citizens travelling in steerage was much higher than in 1st class, with 2nd class in between the two.

³⁰ Based on the definitions and assumptions here, 90% of non-migrants were native-born U.S. citizens, the rest were nearly all Europeans. Most of these non-migrants were summer tourists (based on BI annual reports, Reports of the Immigration Commission, chaired by Senator William P. Dillingham, 1911 [“Dillingham”], and on passenger lists). Most of the rest were businessmen on business trips. Naturalized U.S. citizens, in sharp distinction, overwhelmingly crossed the Atlantic in order to visit family members back in Europe, to bring the intellectual and financial fruits of labor in the United States to those European family members, and to help them to also migrate to America. Naturalized citizen arrivers *before 1900* were, however, small in number, and are not included in the migrant totals compiled here (Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” 56). See Appendix 1 below, especially part C.

³¹ This was because U.S. federal government records did not classify as “immigrants” the following groups (rounded percentages of all migrants, for 1900–14, are in brackets): Non-citizen migrants in the second class [+1%], naturalized U.S. citizens [+5%—see prior two footnotes for the logic], westbound “domicile resumers” (multiple crossers) [+6%]. See Appendix 2 below.

³² The repeat migrant crossing rates are from the 1900–14 totals at the bottom of Table A-1 in Appendix 1 (2,613/13,419 = 19% westward, 5,171/13,419 = 42% eastward). Migrants from North and West Europe were under counted (and the relative size of “New Immigrants” from south and east Europe consequently overstated) because they travelled more often in the second class that were excluded from “immigration” counts

- 1) Westbound repeat migrant crossings were 19% of total westbound migrants crossings [versus the U.S. immigration authorities' estimates of 12%]
- 2) Eastbound repeat migrant crossings were 42% of total westbound migrant crossings [versus the U.S. immigration authorities' estimated "return rate"³³ of 33%]
- 3) Migrants to and from South and East Europe were about 68% of total westbound migrants [versus the U.S. immigration authorities' figures of "New Immigrants" being 75% of total]

To better understand the dimensions of transatlantic repeat migration in the decades preceeding World War I it is useful to look comprehensively at the overall relocation between Europe and America. By the definition established here,³⁴ every migrant began his or her migratory experience by making a westward crossing from Europe to the U.S. All subsequent crossings were repeat migration crossings. To properly count (gross) flows of migration and repeat migration, one thus first needs a reliable measure of westward and eastward crossings. The time series of westward and eastward flows for 1870 to 1914, presented in

before 1904 (PCR), Drew Keeling, "The Improvement of Travel Conditions for Migrants Crossing the North Atlantic, 1900–1914" (to be published within edited collection entitled "Points of Passage: Jewish Trans-migrants from Eastern Europe in Germany Britain, and Scandinavia"), and had higher rates of (undercounted) repeat migration westbound (see, for example, Table 4 below). For comparable U.S. government figures: Westbound migrants in the cabin class are estimated by BI for 1899 (see Hutchinson, 984), in BI Annual Reports (1900, 5, 1901, 4, 1902, 5, 1903, 5), and in *Facts about Immigration* (New York: National Civic Federation, 1907), 106. Westbound repeat immigrants are estimated in Dillingham, vol. 1, 104, vol. 3, 358–59, eastbound flows (emigration as % of immigration) in Dillingham, vol. 1, 181–84, vol. 3, 372. Figures for "New Immigration" (as defined by Dillingham, vol. 1, 170) are given, by "race" in the BI, Annual Report for 1914, 101–02. These three pairs of ratios are not exactly comparable because the government estimates are (presumably) ratios of persons not crossings. This does not make a tremendous difference, however, because a large majority of repeat migrants crossed the ocean a total of either two or three times. In other words, they made at most one *repeat* crossing in either direction (e.g. for them, the number of repeat crossings in each direction equaled the number of repeat crossers). As a hypothetical example, suppose, in round numbers, 10 million migrants moved west, 12% of them made multiple crossings, and 90% of those crossed west two times, 10% three times. Then, the rate of repeat westbound *crossers* would be 12%. The rate of repeat westbound *crossings* would be (using millions) 1.32 (= 1.2+1.2) repeat westbound crossings divided by 11.32 (10+1.32) total westbound crossings, or 1.32 divided by 11.32 = 11.7%.

³³ As stated in Dillingham, vol. 3, 372: "... the outward movement or emigration of aliens has been approximately one third as great as the immigration movement."

³⁴ In the first section ("Physical migration...") above.

Appendix 1, have been accordingly corrected for inconsistencies in U.S. government data after 1900.³⁵ Table 1 shows summary results:

Table 1. Annual average migrant crossings in '000s, by direction, 1870–1914

Fiscal Years	Westward	Eastward	East/West	East/Total
1870–82	291	62	21%	18%
1883–99	403	132	33%	25%
1900–14	899	382	42%	30%

Source: Based on Appendix 1 below.

All eastbound migrant crossings are, by the definition used here, repeat migration flows. Movements westbound are less clear-cut, because they consist of a mixture of first-time crossings (not repeat migration) and non-first-time crossings (repeat migration). As noted already, 19% of westward migrant crossings between 1900 and 1914 were made by migrants who had already crossed west (at least) once before.³⁶ Although records of repeat westbound flows are not available before 1896,³⁷ it is clear that such repeat traffic must have increased in volume over 1870–1914, and faster than overall migration did. Based on Table 1 above, the maximum conceivable rate of repeat migrant crossings during 1870–82, for example (if 100% of eastward crossings during those years generated one additional crossing west (again) over that same thirteen year time period), would be 18%, versus the 19% rate of 1900–14. More realistic (lower) estimates of westbound repeat flows during 1870–99, and their relative growth over the 1870–1914 period as a whole, are shown in Appendix 4.

In order to better appreciate the reasons behind the secular rise of repeat migrant crossings, eastward and westward, it is useful to also examine their seasonal and cyclical patterns. This aspect is taken up in the section which follows below.

³⁵ See columns 3 and 8 of Table A-1 below. Note that the years after 1900 comprised one-third of the time span but accounted for about 60% of the flows.

³⁶ This is based on the second to last row of columns 3 and 4 of Table A-1 in Appendix 1: 2,613 / 13,491 = 19%.

³⁷ See Hutchinson, 990–91.

5. *Seasons, Reasons and Regions: when, where, and why repeat migration occurred*

Migrants made multiple crossings for a variety of reasons, beyond the usually appreciated final repatriation for retirement or response to disappointment in America.³⁸ Many went home seasonally, and with greater relative frequency to Northern Europe in the summer than to and from Italy in the winter on the archetypal “bird-of-passage” routes. Many also went from the United States to Europe temporarily: to “escape” cyclical unemployment in America. Another often overlooked form of repeat migration are the crossings of those who went back to Europe in order to then accompany relatives on another, later, journey to America. A comparison for the end of the period, 1909–13, between the overall migration movements as measured in this paper³⁹ and those used by most prior scholars, highlights the much greater magnitude of the eastward flow that results from defining migrants to include, in essence, all European-born passengers other than tourists and business travellers:

Table 2. Eastward crossings as % of westward, by European origin region, 1909–13

Regions	Bureau of Immigration classifications	more inclusive measures	
	[1] (“Emigrants” / “Immigrants”)	[2] All Migrants who were not U.S. Citizens	[3] All Migrants
North Europe	16%	42%	48%
East “ ”	21%	29%	29%
South “ ”	34%	47%	49%
ALL Europe	24%	40%	42%

Sources: BI Immigration Bulletins, BI annual reports, and Table A-1 of Appendix 1 below. [1] “Immigrants” and “Emigrants” are as defined by the BI during this period. This excludes westbound repeat migrants and “alien residents of the United States making a temporary trip abroad” (BI annual report for 1908, p. 102 (serial set)). Rates in column [2] are adjusted to exclude non-migrants (tourists and short term business travellers) from Europe. [3] “Migrants”, as used consistently herein, equals [2] *plus naturalized* U.S. citizens. A yet slightly broader measure, all 2nd and 3rd class passengers (not shown here, but shown in Appendix 1) yields virtually identical results: (44% for all Europe). Regional breakdowns based on BI Bulletins’ data on immigrants, by “race.”

³⁸ Wyman, 75–76.

³⁹ E.g. in table 1 above and Appendices 1 and 2 below.

Subdivisions of repeat migrant flows can be made based on the season and stage of the business cycle when the crossing occurred. This procedure leads to the following seven sub-categories of eastbound and non-first-time westbound crossings, based on the probable reasons behind them:

Table 3. Categories of Repeat Migration by timing and purpose (and their estimated size)

- 1) "Summer": Crossings of migrants departing the U.S. in May, June, or July and returning the following August, September, or October.
- 2) "Year End": Crossings of migrants departing the U.S. in November or December and returning the following January to June.
- 3) "Cyclical": Crossings of migrants departing the U.S. during recessions and returning during the next subsequent recovery.
- 4) "Other Short Term": All other migrant crossings consisting of east-then-westward roundtrip journeys completed within twelve months.
- 5) "Debarred": Crossings of migrants returning to Europe because they were denied entry at U.S. arrival ports.⁴⁰
- 6) "Permanent return": All eastbound crossings made by migrants who did not come to America again. (This group and the debarred group, by definition, consist of eastward migrant crossings only.)
- 7) Long Term: All other repeat migrant crossings.

As a % of all repeat migrants, in both directions, 1900–1914:⁴¹

Summer	15%
Year End Seasonal	13%
Cyclical	15%
Other Short Term	9%
Long Term	7%
Debarred (east only)	2%
Permanent Return (east only)	38%

⁴⁰ Some debarred from entry, and sent back to Europe, soon tried again and were successful, at a *different* port. Since they typically had never actually "been in" the US before (other than in an inspection station the first time) they were not counted as repeat migrants, even though they had crossed the ocean three times in order to enter America once. No attempt is made here to correct for this additional example of unnoticed repeat migration. It is small in size because total debarments, including those who did *not* try again, amounted to somewhat less than 1% of all migrant arrivals in this period. I am nonetheless grateful to Marian Smith of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service for calling my attention to it.

⁴¹ "Permanent Return" is based on the overall relation of eastbound and westbound repeat migration shown and derived in Appendix I below. "Debarred" numbers are from BI annual reports. The other five categories are estimated, month by month, based on available shipping and immigration statistics (the latter adjusted to include naturalized citizens and exclude migrants not from Europe) and by region, based on BI Bulletin figures for 1909–13. "Summer," "Year End Seasonal," and "Cyclical," are based on seasonal and cyclical deviations from trend. The remaining

While these percentages are only approximate estimates based on available data for 1900–14, they make it readily apparent that repeat migration was a broad and varied phenomenon.

Repeat migration across the Atlantic rose after 1900 and more quickly than did overall migration, but there were important differences between European source regions and calendar seasons. Repeat migration of northern Europeans (e.g. from the British Isles and Scandinavia) was dominated by short summer visits (to Europe in early summer, back to United States in early fall), while repeat migration of southern Europeans mostly consisted of one-time return trips to Europe in the late fall.⁴² In the westbound direction, the northern regions of Europe had proportionally higher rates of repeat migration than did the southern regions. Available U.S. Bureau of Immigration data, adjusted to be consistent over the period, yield the following results for two key sub-regions:⁴³

Table 4. Repeat Westward Migration as a % of Total Westward Migration

		Long Term	Short Term	All Repeat Westward
1900–05	Italy	7%	4%	11%
1906–08	Italy	7%	5%	12%
1911–14	Italy	11%	7%	18%
1900–05	Scandinavia	6%	10%	16%
1906–08	Scandinavia	7%	14%	21%
1911–14	Scandinavia	11%	20%	31%

Source: These are approximate estimates based on figures in the BI annual reports. They are not comparable to the percentages shown in Table 3, which, for example, include naturalized U.S. citizens (not included in Table 4 here). (Italy and Scandinavia contributed, respectively, 25% and 7% of all migrants from Europe to the U.S. during these years. As in Table 3, “short term” generally means repeat migrant crossings that were part of a transatlantic round-trip completed within a twelve month period.)

residual is divided roughly equally between “Other Short Term” and “Long Term,” based on separate estimations west and eastward (see also Appendix 3 below).

⁴² Many of the northern repeat migrants were naturalized U.S. citizens (*Wall Street Journal*, May 11, 1903, 2). It was common to return to the United States “after harvests abroad are finished” (*Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 1904, 2).

⁴³ BI annual reports, 1900–1914.

6. *Repeat Migration as Risk Management*

Repeat migration across the North Atlantic was related to underlying mechanisms of migrant self-selection within self-replicating kinship and community networks. Temporary summer trips to Europe by migrants already in America, short term moves to Europe to avoid periods of seasonal or cyclical unemployment in the U.S., and the permanent return to origin communities in Europe, all primarily reflected efforts by extended families to cope with uncertainties and vagaries of pursuing economic opportunities on two continents. Amidst their many purposes and characteristics, migration “chains” fundamentally developed as a means for diversifying the risks of migration across multiple individuals and multiple moves per individual.

Migration across the Atlantic a century and more ago, was often viewed as a risky “gamble” by those who considered it, and risks also limited the numbers attempting it.⁴⁴ For those who nonetheless undertook such relocation, migration chains were the principal means of coping with the associated uncertainties and pitfalls. Transatlantic kinship networks not only helped migrants find jobs and accommodations in the New World, and adapt to an unfamiliar language, new laws and new customs, they also helped the immigrant workers outlast periods of low labor demand in the U.S.,⁴⁵ or return to Europe, where living costs were lower, to wait out American slumps there.

Late nineteenth and early twentieth century North Atlantic passenger shipping companies, whose activities were characterized by unusually high fixed costs and fluctuating demand, were in a business more risky than most. The biggest and riskiest segment of their business was migrant traffic.⁴⁶ One way shipping lines coped with drastically fluctuating demand for migrant travel, was to make some of their carrying capacity interchangeable between migrants and tourists. Seasonally, for example, migrants moved west to America most heavily in the late spring, at a time when tourists (overwhelmingly Americans going for summer trips to Europe) approached a peak in the eastbound direction. Having the same quarters used in opposite directions by

⁴⁴ See section 2 above (“Why did so few leave Europe?”).

⁴⁵ See, for instance, the charitable functions of immigrant mutual aid societies described in Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921), 124–32.

⁴⁶ Keeling, “Networks,” 122, note 26.

migrants and tourists, however, required upgrading accommodations for migrants, from the “open-berth” dormitories typically found in nineteenth century steerage, to a quality level also acceptable to at least “second class” tourists. By 1914, most migrants on routes from and to the U.K. and Scandinavia, where summer repeat migration was most frequent, were housed in such “closed-berth” quarters. Improved on-board offerings (including more deck space, and better dining facilities as well as the more private enclosed cabins) were also a logical consequence of the scale economies which helped foster an approximately five-fold increase in average ship size over the period. These on-board improvements, in turn, further encouraged migrants to consider making the (thereby) less onerous crossing more than once.⁴⁷

Repeat migration across the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Atlantic was more substantial, more widespread, and more directly related to the underlying causal processes of that relocation than prior scholarship indicates. Looking more explicitly and fundamentally at repeat migration, measuring it more accurately, and examining its causes more comprehensively allows for a better integration of hitherto rather disparate historiographical findings.

Scholars of cross-border migration have long been aware of the critical importance of kinship and community networks. More sporadically, they have also acknowledged the curious dichotomy of millions of Europeans a century ago voluntarily seeking economic betterment overseas while *tens* of millions of demographically and economically similar contemporaries voluntarily stayed in Europe. Widespread and growing repeat migration is a central linkage between these two important features of mass relocation across the pre-1914 Atlantic.

By at least the late 1880s, risk considerations (not upfront costs) were the primary barrier that kept most Europeans from pursuing opportunities for economic improvement in America. Chain migra-

⁴⁷ The increasing ship size was used in two ways: to carry more passengers and to provide more space per passenger. About 65% of migrants on these northern routes traveled in closed-berth cabins by the end of the period. Overall (on the main routes between Europe and the U.S. during 1900 to 1914), about 35% of migrants were in closed berths, of which 15% were in second class and 20% in third class. Keeling, “Transportation Revolution”, 50, 58–59, “Conditions,” especially Appendix 2. For passenger shipping lines, the advantages of an increased rate of multiple crossings per migrant can be seen in Appendix 4 below. The growing countercyclical eastward flow during recessions late in the period (1904–13) helped dampen overall fluctuations in migration volume across that business cycle (a central dilemma for the shipping companies whose costs varied hardly at all with these wide swings in travel demand).

tion was the principal means by which those who chose to surmount that barrier managed to do so. Repeat moves were a vital element of the risk-managing strategies within those kinship chains. Notwithstanding important differences across time and place, these findings also have applicability for long-distance migration beyond the case of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century North Atlantic. It is quite likely, for example, and for reasons not at all unrelated to the findings in Jan de Vries' *Age of Crisis*, that repeat migration—though lower than it later became—was higher in the eighteenth century than migration scholars have generally supposed. That possibility is one of several raised here that may be among those well-suited for future creative inquiry in the manner so skillfully exemplified by the economic and historical analyses of Jan de Vries.

Appendix 1: Derivation and analysis of migrant flows, 1870–1914

A. Table A-1. Passenger flows between Europe* and U.S., 1870–1914 ('000s, fiscal yrs ended June 30)

Column #:	Westward arrivals in the U.S.				Eastward departures from the U.S.			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Derivation:	US Gov't "Immigrants"	Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class West	calculated Migrants West	calculated REPEAT Migrants West	US Gov't By sea in steerage	US Gov't "Emigrants"	Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class East	calculated Migrants East
1870	329		329 e		44			44 e
1871	265		265 e		46			46 e
1872	352		352 e		43			43 e
1873	397		397 e		62			62 e
1874	263		263 e		83			83 e
1875	183		183 e		106			106 e
1876	121		121 e		83			83 e
1877	106		106 e		76			76 e
1878	102		102 e		61			61 e
1879	134		134 e		51			51 e
1880	349		349 e		41			41 e
1881	528		528 e		48			48 e
1882	648		648 e		63			63 e
1883	523		523 e		78			78 e
1884	454		454 e		101			101 e
1885	353		353 e		154			154 e

Table A-1 (cont.)

Column #:	Westward arrivals in the U.S.			Eastward departures from the U.S.				
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Derivation:	US Gov't	Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class West	calculated Migrants West	calculated REPEAT Migrants West	US Gov't By sea in steerage	US Gov't East	Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class East	calculated Migrants East
1886	329		329 e		113			113 e
1887	483		483 e		102			102 e
1888	538		538 e		114			114 e
1889	435		435 e		140			140 e
1890	446		446 e		132			132 e
1891	546		546 e		139			139 e
1892	612 e		612 e		151			151 e
1893	492 e		492 e		135			135 e
1894	304 e		304 e		191			191 e
1895	270 e		270 e		217			217 e
1896	329		329 e		121 e			121 e
1897	216		216 e		98 e			98 e
1898	218		218 e		131			131 e
1899	297		297 e		128			128 e
1900	425	489	471	79	137		176	145
1901	469	560	535	99	158		195	173
1902	619	695	677	94	169		203	187

Table A-1 (cont.)

Column #:	Westward arrivals in the U.S.				Eastward departures from the U.S.			
	[1] US Gov't "Immigrants"	[2] Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class West	[3] calculated Migrants West	[4] calculated REPEAT Migrants West	[5] US Gov't By sea in steerage	[6] US Gov't East	[7] Ship lines 2nd & 3rd Class East	[8] calculated Migrants East
1903	815	860	846	104	207		237	219
1904	768	795	781	125	324		345	327
1905	974	1,013	999	213	335		391	373
1906	1,018	1,108	1,092	187	282		346	327
1907	1,200	1,331	1,314	196	345		430	397
1908	692	820	799	178	638	377	841	811
1909	655	862	829	342	342	181	446	413
1910	926	1,074	1,044	200	327	154	370	344
1911	765	906	876	171	432	231	492	466
1912	719	872	843	210	505	286	541	509
1913	1,056	1,228	1,201	232	450	249	510	482
1914	1,058	1,207	1,183	185	520	257	578	553
1900-14:	12,159	13,818	13,491	2,613	5,171		6,101	5,726
1870-1914:	22,781		24,113		8,222			8,778

* = except for column 5 which includes more than Europe

e = estimated here (for 1870-99) as being westward = column 1, eastward = column 5; re col. 1, 1892-95, see section C

Sources: See sections B and C immediately below

B. *Methods used in Table A-1*

Of the eight columns in Table A-1, the three most crucial to the analysis of repeat migration are Migrants West (column 3), Repeat Migrants West (column 4), and Migrants East (column 8). To achieve better overall consistency, different sources were used before 1900 than after 1900 in deriving these three data columns:

- 1) Before 1900, the basic U.S. government time series, immigrant arrivals (column 1) and steerage departures (column 5), consistently and closely approximate the broader migrant flows westward and eastward, as defined in section 1 of this paper, and shown in columns 3 and 8.
- 2) During 1900–14 the government data deviate more sharply, more variably, and more traceably from migration, as broadly defined here. For that period, columns 3 and 8 (the migrant flows west and east) were instead derived from the more consistent shipping data of columns 2 and 7. (The main difference between columns 3 and 8 and the shipping time series is that non-migrant 2nd class passengers were deducted from columns 3 and 8 after 1900).
- 3) There were essentially no figures kept on repeat migrants westbound (column 4) before the late 1890s. Repeat migrant flows in the westward direction before 1900 are therefore not shown in Table A-1 of Appendix 1 immediately above, but are instead estimated in Appendix 4 below.

C. *Sources used in Table A-1*

Column 1: Historical Statistics of the United States, series C-89–101, except for 1892–95 where it deviates from the more reliable Bureau of Statistics data which is then used instead (see Hutchinson, pp. 982–83, and notes to column 5 below) with estimates to adjust for the small fraction of flows which were not from Europe.

Column 2: Transatlantic Passenger Conference records (PCR) for traffic to and from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore.

Column 3: Before 1900, estimated as equal to column 1. For 1900 through 1914, estimated by making small adjustments (not over 1% individually or in toto, net) to annual BI figures for immigrants to the four main ports, so as to reflect regular paying passengers from Europe, and thus be consistent with the shipping figures of column 2. For example, passengers debarred at the entry ports are included as “estimated migrants,” but stowaways are not. Two

larger adjustments are the inclusion of immigrants in cabin class (excluded by BI before 1903) and repeat migrants (mostly excluded by BI, after 1905). Figures in this column, after 1900, also include flows of naturalized U.S. citizens, estimated by using available data for citizens in the steerage class on arriving steamships. See also Appendix 2 below.

Column 4: Derived in Appendix 3 below.

Column 5: U.S. Bureau of Statistics data, reproduced in “Quarterly Report No.2, Series 1892-‘93” from “Annual Reports on Foreign Commerce and Navigation.”

Column 6: BI annual reports: Table XX (1908) and Table VIII (1909–14)

Column 7: PCR

Column 8: Before 1900, estimated as equal to column 5. For 1900 through 1914, derived by deducting estimated eastward non-migrant crossings from total eastward passenger flows (including first class, not shown here). Intra-annual allocations of migrant flows (west and east) are similarly derived. Eastbound transits are smaller as a % of 2nd and 3rd class flows than westbound because tourists (in 2nd class) all travelled both east and west, whereas a majority or large minority of migrants travelled only west (once).

D. *The effect of various minor omissions on the rate of eastbound repeat migration* (the overall net effect is estimated in Table A-3 below)

Because transatlantic migrants from Europe initially reached the U.S by traversing the ocean westwards, the first and most significant component of *repeat* migration consists of eastward moves back to Europe. In this section of Appendix 1 the effect of various minor errors and omissions from the migration flows summed in Table A-1 is gauged by estimating how this imprecision, if corrected for, might change the rate of eastward to westward migrant crossings. The cumulative effect turns out to be rather small, because each of the several errors and omissions is quite small.

i. Counting of departures

Column 1 of Table A-1 covers only arrivals from Europe, whereas column 5, before 1900, includes movement to all foreign countries. By-country breakdowns available for 1890–95 show that 8% of such departures were to non European countries (Bureau of Statistics:

“Foreign Commerce and Navigation,” 1800–95), thus, for this reason, the column 8 figures *overstate* the U.S. to Europe flow before 1900.

This overstatement is, however, mostly offset by a bias toward *undercounting* inherent in the way these departure statistics were compiled. Migrants departing *to* Europe (in contrast to those arriving *from* Europe) were not inspected upon embarkation or disembarkation, nor were they recorded in detailed government-required passenger manifests. The U.S. Bureau of Immigration (BI) relied upon the “courtesy of the agents of steamship and packet lines for information on the outward passenger movement,” and during busy times agents did not fully count all departing passengers. The resulting under-reporting can be measured by comparing BI departing passenger figures against PCR. Figures for 1906–1914 show that the BI undercounted departures by an average of 5%. The net effect thus amounts to about a 3% (8% less 5%) overstating of eastbound flows for the years 1870–99, in Table A-1.

ii. Some repeat migrants possibly not included in “immigrants” figures even before 1900

According to Hutchinson (994) “aliens” arriving at U.S. ports between 1868 and 1891 were “counted as immigrants on each re-entry”, unless they were “temporary visitors”. It seems likely, however, that at least some ports in some years before 1891 did not classify some repeat migrants as immigrants in their record-keeping (e.g. see New York State Commissioners of Emigration, annual report for 1884).

iii. Migrants going from Europe through Canada to the United States

Some European migrants coming to the United States via Canada were not counted as being immigrants from Europe. Undoubtedly some of those migrants later departed the U.S. for Europe, without going back through Canada enroute. The rate of eastbound migrant flows relative to westbound indicated by Table A-1 is thus slightly inflated, to the extent that such migrants were counted in the departures column (8) but not in the arrivals column (3). Any such overstatement, however, is small. At an extreme, if 100% of all immigrants coming into the U.S. from Canada came through it from Europe, and if 0% of migrants leaving the U.S. for Europe departed via Canada, the calculated rates of eastbound crossings, relative to westbound, would be altered (at most) as shown in Table A-2 below (column 6; for example, for 1900–14, the rate would be 41% instead of 42%):

Table A-2. Maximum effect of including migration between Europe and USA *through* Canada

Column #:	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
	Westward Migrants	Estimated European Migrants via Canada	Westward Migrants including via Canada	Eastward Migrants	Eastward Rate	
					without via Canada	with via Canada
<i>Derivation:</i>	from Table A-1	see below	= [1] + [2]	from Table A-1	= [4] / [1]	= [4] / [3]
1870–82:	3,777	648	4,425	807	21%	18%
1883–99:	6,845	844	7,689	2,245	33%	29%
1900–14:	13,491	427	13,917	5,726	42%	41%

Sources for column 2: Dillingham Report, vol.3, 30–44 (for 1870–84), Hutchinson, 986–87 (for 1885–99), Appendix 2 below (for 1900–14).

iv. Naturalized citizens and cabin class migrants

For the years prior to 1900, naturalized citizens are excluded from column 1 in Table A-1, and thus also from the final estimated westbound migration flows of column 3 in that table, for those years. The treatment of migrants in the cabin class is more ambiguous, but they too were left out of the “immigrant” totals in at least some years before 1900. Both these groups were smaller as a percentage of total migrants, and in both directions, before 1900 than they were thereafter, however. (See Hutchinson, 983–85, Keeling, “Transportation Revolution”, table A3, 60–61.)

v. Overall effect

The overall effect of these various small inaccuracies and omissions (outlined in parts i–iv above) upon the rate of eastward to westward crossings is estimated below in Table A-3. As that table shows, their impact is not very large, either individually or in toto. They mainly effect the years before 1900. Correcting (á la Table A-3) for Table A-1’s slight overstating of eastward moves, and understating of westward moves, leads to the aggregate result that the numbers in Table A-1 slightly overstate the east/west crossings ratio before 1900, and therefore slightly understate its rise after 1900. As summarized in Table A-3, the estimated cumulative effect is that the east/west rate, from the early part to the late part of the 1870–1914 period, goes from about 16% to 42% instead of from about 21% to 42% (as indicated by the Table A-1 data -developed in Appendix 4).

vi. Time lags

A further omitted factor is more relevant to the rate of east/west *crossers* than *crossings*, and its effect on both is fairly small, and it is not addressed in Table A-3 because it is difficult to determinate whether appropriate adjustments would raise or lower east/west rates measured over spans of a decade or longer. This “omission” amounts to an uncorrected-for “apples-to-oranges” mismatch occurring because eastward travel followed westward after a *lapse of time spent in the U.S.* The time lag seems to have averaged about three years, but there are few usable statistics, it is not easy to estimate, and it probably varied somewhat over the business cycle. (A similar lag pertains to the rate of westbound repeat crossings; e.g. time spent *in Europe* between crossings to America). For the purposes of the analysis here, however, time lag effects were small, for two reasons: (1) The length of the three periods being compared (13–17 years) insures that a large majority of people moving east as well as west would have completed both legs of the roundtrip within the period, e.g. no lag effect. (2) Time lags thus mainly impact the directional crossings rates at the beginning and end of each period, and, measuring over the entire period, the two impacts at either end are opposite (offsetting). (For example, in the first year of each period, most eastward moves were made by people whose previous westward move was made *before* the period began. In the last year of the period most westward moves were made by people who, if they ever crossed east again, did so *after* the period ended.). An “overcount” of eastward moves early in the period is thus offset by an “undercount” towards the period end. The offset largely, though not perfectly, eliminates the impact of the time lag mismatch.

Table A-3. Estimated net effect on east/west migrant crossing rate of adjusting for minor omissions

From part D above:	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	
			Undercount of flows west due to omitted				
	Crossings east as as % of west (Table A-1)	Net overcount of flows east	Repeat migrants (some)	Crossings through Canada	Naturalized U.S. citizens before 1900	Total Change (sum of (i) through (iv))	Crossings east as as % of west (adjusted here)
1870–82:	21%	-1%	-1%	-2%	-1%	-5%	16%
1883–99:	33%	-1%	-1%	-3%	-2%	-7%	26%
1900–14:	42%			-1%		-1%	42%

Sources: See Appendix 1, part D, sections (i) through (v) above.

For (ii), flows west adjusted up 3% for 1870–82, 2% for 1883–99.

For (iii), flows west adjusted up by 2/3 of the maximum amount estimated in Table A-2 above.

For (iv), flows west adjusted up 2% for 1870–82, 5% for 1883–99; east up 9% and 13% respectively.

Note: minor discrepancies in table above due to rounding.

Appendix 2. Westbound Crossings of "Immigrants", Migrants, Second and Third Class Passengers, Europe to United States, 1900-14


	in '000s	as % Immigrants
<i>Immigrant Arrivals from Europe (Table A-1, col. 1)</i>	12,159	
<u>Migrants who were not "immigrants"</u>		+15%
Naturalized U.S. citizen arrivals	+ 606	
Westbound "domicile resumption"	+ 758	
Cabin class arrivals before 1904, in-transit, debarred	+ 510	
<u>"Immigrants" who were not regular passengers to main ports</u>		-4%
Migrant crossings through Canada	-426	
Arrivals of stowaways, deserters, migrants on irregular vessels, or through minor ports	-116	
<i>Migrant Crossings West (Table A-1, col. 3)</i>	= 13,491	+11%
<u>Migrants who were not 2nd and 3rd class passengers</u>		-1%
Migrant crossings in First Class	-135	
<u>2nd and 3rd class passengers who were not migrants</u>		+4%
Non-Migrant crossings in Second Class	415	
Non-Migrant crossings in Third Class	48	
<i>2nd and 3rd Class West (Table A-1, col. 2)</i>	= 13,818	

Sources: "Immigrants" are as variously defined by the U.S. Bureau of Immigration or BI (see text). *Naturalized U.S. Citizens*: estimated year by year based on available sources showing them (over the period as a whole) equal to about one quarter of arriving citizens from Europe. For example, BI and PCR data for 1901-05 and 1907 show about 28% of arriving citizens at New York came in steerage class from Europe. This percentage declined somewhat after 1907 due to the growing arrivals of native-born U.S. tourists and business travellers, particularly from non-European ports (Caribbean) which swelled the total count of arriving citizens. *Domicile resumption* (aliens "returning to resume domiciles formerly acquired in this country," BI Annual Report, 1906, p. 45, cited in Hutchinson, p. 992, note 78): per BI annual reports, table 15 (for 1906), table 14 (for 1907-14) with adjustment for flows not from Europe. See also Willcox, vol. 2, p. 656. *Cabin Class*: per BI annual reports, 1900-03, table 6, with deductions for tourists, passengers not from Europe, etc. *Through Canada*: for 1900-05 from BI annual reports for 1904, 78 and 1905, 63, for 1906-14, BI annual reports "admitted through Canada" (Table 1) less "last permanent residence" in Canada (BI annual reports, table 5 (1906-08) and table 8 (1909-14)). *Stowaways, deserters, irregular vessels*, etc.: from BI annual reports. *Migrants in 1st class*: based on the excess of Westbound over Eastbound first class passengers over the 1900-14 period as a whole (PCR). *Non-Migrant crossings in 2nd and 3rd class*: based on calculations from PCR compared to BI immigration data, and corroborated by passenger list samples.

Appendix 3. Repeat Migrant Crossings Westbound, Europe to U.S., 1900–14, by statistical category and sub-period (in '000s and % of all sub-period westbound repeat migrant crossings)

	1900–1905	1906–1914	1900–1914	
<i>Measured by U.S. Bureau of Immigration (BI)</i>				
Immigrants “been in the U.S. before”	478	468	946	
<i>Not Measured by BI</i>				
<i>because not reported as “been in U.S. before”</i>				
Long Term Repeat “Immigrant” arrivals		278	278	11%
<i>because not considered “immigrants”</i>				
Naturalized U.S. citizens	210	396	606	23%
“Domicile Resumption”		758	758	29%
Repeat migrant arrivals in cabin class	25		25	1%
<i>Total Repeat Migrant Crossings</i>	713	1,900	2,613	
<i>Total % missed by BI</i>	33%	75%		64%

Sources: “Been in US before”: BI Table 2, Dillingham, vol. 3, p. 359. *Long Term Repeat*: not separately measured during 1900–05 (included in “been before”), BI reports for 1906–08, 1909–14 estimated based on 1906–08 ratio to “been before” *Naturalized U.S. Citizens, Domicile Resumption*: see Appendix 2. *Repeat Migrants in Cabin*: estimated by multiplying the BI repeat ratio (European Race “Immigrants Been Before” / European Race “Immigrants”) to all Migrants in Cabin (from Appendix 2)



Appendix 4. Annual average migrant flows between Europe and USA (by direction, type, and business cycle phase, in '000s), 1870-82 versus 1904-13

Sources for 1870-82: Flows derived from Table A-1 above, business cycle phases per Gary M. Walton and Hugh Rockoff, *History of the American Economy* (Fort Worth: Dryden Press, (7th edition) 1994), p. 400. Repeat-west estimated at 50% of eastward flows (during 1900-14, it was 46%). Distribution of the repeat-west volume over the three business cycle phases set proportionate to the time pattern of 1904-1913 (Table A-1). First-time west equals All-west less repeat-west. Sources for 1904-13: Flows per Table A-1 and Appendix 3, first time-west = All west minus repeat-west, business cycle phases per Harry Jerome, *Migration and Business Cycles*, National Bureau of Economic Research Publication no. 9. (St. Albans, Vt.: Messenger, 1926).